

ANNEXURE B

SOS'S SUBMISSION - THE PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING DISCUSSION PAPER SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROPOSALS

1. PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING OUR CONCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING

- 1.1. As the Coalition we believe strongly that public broadcasting serving a democratic developmental state needs to be underpinned by the principles of universal service, institutional autonomy, editorial and programming independence, and public accountability.
- 1.2. Our understanding of the **developmental state** is one which is not authoritarian and statist. A developmental state must be rooted in democratic processes which facilitate participatory democracy by the broad mass of South Africa's people, including through their representative and community-based organisations. This "bottom up" notion of the developmental state requires the broadest possible public participation and maximum transparency, accountability and a free flow of information between government and its citizens. We see the SABC as being critical to the proper functioning of this democratic developmental state.
- 1.3. Our understanding of **universal service** is that every person in South Africa is entitled to receive both radio and television programming in one or more of the official languages in his or her home. We do however recognise that this is a signal distribution matter i.e. a technical challenge, more appropriate for Electronic Communications Network Services ("ECNS") licensees, than the SABC itself.
- 1.4. Our understanding of **institutional autonomy** is that the SABC must be governed by structures that protect and enhance its public accountability through being independent of all vested and powerful interests whether political, commercial or social. Hence, no political party or commercial grouping should be in a position to control the affairs of the SABC including the ability to appoint or remove its board or interfere with the appointment or removal of its executive management. We believe that one of the best ways of protecting the SABC's institutional autonomy and public accountability is

through Parliament's active involvement in board appointments, removals and general organisational oversight guided only by the public interest.

1.5. Our understanding of **editorial and programming independence** is that the SABC must exercise its Constitutional right to freedom of expression so that ordinary citizens can enjoy the right of access to information necessary to empower them to:

- Participate meaningfully in our democracy on the basis of being informed
- Hold public power accountable
- Be involved in decision-making to ensure socio-economic development

It is essential that the SABC, particularly in its news and current affairs programming, is able to report on all issues without fear or favour. In this regard we include independence not only from politicians or the ruling party of the day but also powerful commercial and social interests.

1.6. Our understanding of **public accountability** is that the broadcast media in our country should be accountable to its viewers and listeners both as audiences and as citizens. In terms of audiences, the SABC needs to entertain, inform and educate us in our own languages and in ways that develop our unique culture(s). As citizens, the SABC is responsible for deepening democracy, building a commitment to our Constitution and fostering economic and social development. We believe one of the best ways of protecting the SABC's public accountability is through ICASA's active involvement in monitoring compliance with the SABC's Charter (setting out its public mandate), licence conditions and public broadcasting legislation and regulations. There are also a number of other ways the corporation can be held accountable including through the establishment of national and regional public stakeholder committees and the creation of an Office of the Public Editor. (See below for further details.)

2. PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE SABC

2.1. Vision and mandate

We propose that the public mandate of the SABC ought to be clearly enshrined in an SABC Charter which ought to guide every radio and television service provided by the SABC. We believe that only the broad principles of public service broadcasting should be included in the Charter, the details of this mandate should be expanded on in the license conditions of SABC's various television and radio services.

SOS believes that the review of the Charter should take place once every seven years (or a similar appropriate period). ICASA then needs to take on board any issues arising from this review to ensure that the SABC's licenses are aligned with any new principles included in the Charter.

The review process ought to be characterised by openness, public consultation and participation and a willingness to hear what the SABC's audience think of the SABC's mandate and the direction it ought to be heading. In our view, the Department is the body best able to facilitate maximum public participation in such a review process, given its resources and governmental mandate.

The SOS believes that the Department, as is the case with other legislation, ought to present to Parliament its Charter review document containing proposed amendments based on the public review processes outlined above.

Parliament ought to be responsible for actually enacting the proposed amendments to the Charter, if any, through a Public Service Broadcasting Act amendment process which itself would allow for additional public comment and participation.

We propose that the following Charter be adopted, but only once it has been extensively debated and discussed with citizens, audiences, interested stakeholders etc. We propose the following:

“The Charter of the Corporation sets out the public mandate of the SABC, which public mandate is to:

Build the nation and for this purpose to:

- Contribute to democracy, the development of society, gender equality, including non-discrimination as regards sexual orientation, nation building and the provision of education;
- Safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of the Country;
- Reflect both the unity and diverse cultural, political, social and economic fabric of the Country;
- Develop a strong and committed public broadcasting service which will service the needs of society;
- Use its best endeavours to ensure that public broadcasting services are available throughout the country; and

- Encourage the development of human resources, training and capacity building within the public broadcaster.

Provide the public with excellent up-to-date informative programming and for this purpose to:

- Provide, in its public broadcasting services, radio and television programming that informs, educates and entertains;
- Ensure a plurality of news, views and information;
- Provide significant news and public affairs programming which meets the highest standards of journalism, as well as fair and unbiased coverage, impartiality, balance and independence from government, commercial and other interests;
- Ensure that public broadcasting services provide a reasonable, balanced opportunity for the public to receive a variety of points of view on matters of public concern;
- Cater for a broad range of services and specifically for the programming needs in respect of children, women, the youth and the disabled
- Include significant amounts of educational programming, both curriculum based and informal educative topics from a wide range of social, political and economic issues, including, but not limited to, human rights, health, early childhood development, agriculture, culture, justice and commerce contributing to a shared consciousness and identity;
- Include national sports programming;
- Ensure public broadcasting programming shall be drawn from local, regional, national and international sources;
- Ensure that public broadcasting services comply with the code of conduct for broadcasting; and
- Be responsive to audience needs and account on how to meet these needs.

Contribute to the development of the Country's culture, languages and local cultural industries and for that purpose to:

- Encourage the development of local programming content;
- Enrich the cultural heritage of the Country by providing support for traditional and contemporary artistic expression;
- Ensure, as far as reasonably possible, that public broadcasting services provide a range of high-quality programming in all of the Country's official languages to all citizens; and

- To nurture the Country's talent and carry out research and development for the benefit of audiences; and
- Provide a public broadcasting service of the highest technical standard and for that purpose to ensure that public broadcasting services comply with international technical standards

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2.2. Legal structure of the SABC

The SABC limited ("the SABC") became a public company only after the implementation of the Broadcasting Act, 1999 ("the Broadcasting Act"). Before that it operated as a statutory body governed by the provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1976 ("the '76 Broadcasting Act"). The Broadcasting White Paper of 1998 suggested that the SABC, as a matter of government policy, be corporatized to pave the way for possible partial privatisation through the participation of a strategic equity partner or private shareholder at some future date. The SABC is thus now a public company incorporated in terms of the Companies Act, 1977 ("the Companies Act") having a share capital and with the state as sole shareholder.

There are obviously a number of important benefits to having the SABC's legal structure being that of a public company. Firstly, the SABC is required to produce audited financial statements and an annual report. These documents are crucial mechanisms for the public to be able to glean information about the internal workings and activities of the SABC thus making it more publically accountable. Secondly, a number of corporate governance practices are automatically applicable to the SABC. These principles apply as a matter of course to the SABC's Board of Directors. This is another important legal mechanism for ensuring accountability for the operations of the SABC.

However there are also a number of problems with the SABC's legal structure. Chief amongst these is the fact that the state is the sole shareholder. This has lead to a number of problems including:

- the Minister being responsible for drafting the Memorandum and Articles of Association and the Shareholder's Compact, which documents do not accord the SABC the level of independence that it is meant to enjoy under the Broadcasting Act;
- the Minister playing a direct role in the appointment of executive management/directors;
- SABC management being overly concerned about the attitudes of government as its sole shareholder, rather than being driven by broader public interest concerns and/or managers being employed because of their political connections rather than because of their experience, competence and qualifications; and
- Further, the traditional *raison d'être* of companies is to make profits and being a company means that the SABC's commercial performance and commercial considerations have assumed greater importance than meeting its public mandate.

One of the proposals that have surfaced during the work of the Coalition is a proposal to amend Chapter 9 of the Constitution to ensure that the SABC becomes a so-called Chapter 9 body. Chapter 9 of the Constitution is headed: "State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy" and contains special protections for the independence of these institutions which include the Public Protector, the SA Human Rights Commission, the broadcasting regulator and others.

The SABC's role in providing ordinary citizens with quality news, information and education programming is essential to the well being of our Constitutional democracy as only an informed citizenry is fully able to engage in democratic processes. Consequently, we are of the view that the SABC is indeed a public institution that is critical to the strengthening of constitutional democracy and conversely, that it is critical that the Constitution itself protects the special position of the SABC.

Providing Constitutional protection for the SABC would not be new. Indeed section 15(2) of the Interim Constitution that gave birth to our democracy provided that "All media financed by or under the control of the state shall be regulated in a manner which ensures impartiality and the expression of a diversity of opinion." However it was deemed unnecessary to continue to provide constitutional protection to the SABC after the coming into force of the IBA Act and related broadcasting legislation. Unfortunately, the recent prolonged period of crisis at the SABC has demonstrated the clear need to further protect

the SABC against interference by vested interests, whether commercial or political, and a renewed desire to strengthen the Constitutional position of the SABC has emerged.

We propose the insertion of a new clause 184A into the Constitution to be headed “The Public Broadcaster”. This clause will set out the main objects of the public broadcaster as per the overarching tenets of its Charter. Further we propose that consequential amendments be made to sections dealing generally with the Chapter 9 institutions namely: sections 181, 193, and 194 of the Constitution, specifically to refer to the public broadcaster to avoid the SABC being in a similar position to ICASA which is not seen as entirely part of Chapter 9 as it is not referred to in these generally-applicable provisions.

We believe that ensuring that the SABC becomes a Chapter body will have a number of positive benefits for the SABC including: protecting it from commercial and / or political interference, ensuring that it is adequately resourced, and entrenching its accountability to Parliament as opposed to the Executive.

2.3. Public Accountability of SABC: Proposed Mechanisms

A Board of Public Interest Representatives

In line with our arguments above we believe that The Board of the SABC ought not to be a Board of Directors in the normal corporate sense. In our view the Board ought to be a Board of Public Interest Representatives to ensure that the SABC fulfils its mandate to provide programming in the public interest.

The Board ought to see itself as beholden to the South African public to ensure that the SABC complies with its Charter, as its primary task.

This will, of course, require the Board to give strategic direction to the SABC but will not require it to play a hands-on management role, which role ought to be left to the executive management.

The Board ought to be responsible for the appointment of the Group executive management of the SABC and must hold such executive management to account for the proper functioning of the organisation.

Stakeholder Participation Mechanisms

Recent developments at the SABC have left the public feeling disempowered and utterly remote. The SOS believes that public accountability and stakeholder relations must be a

cornerstone of a transformed SABC and these must go beyond marketing focus groups and audience questionnaires.

The Board ought to ensure accountability to the general public at the most basic level through providing detailed annual reports to Parliament, including the results of audience surveys and other research.

Further, we propose that the SABC establish an Office of the Public Editor. This person needs to be appointed by the Board and given a clear mandate so he/she operates with relative autonomy and the authority of the Board. His/her role should be two fold:

- to adjudicate in disputes over editorial content or conduct, the upholding of the code of conduct, and to pronounce wherever he/she sees fit on the quality and ethics of editorial material
- to promote SABC dialogue with its audience. As such, this office should run provincial stakeholder forums (made up of NGOs, CBOs, viewers and listeners) and other activities to encourage interaction.

The Public Editor could communicate via the web, but also be given screen and radio time.

Further, to the provincial stakeholder committees a national stakeholder committee should to be established including stakeholders directly involved in the work of the SABC e.g. the independent producers, unions and staff associations operating within the SABC. This committee could be established by the Board or jointly by the Board and management.

We further propose that the Annual Licence Condition Reporting to ICASA take place in a public forum where everyone is invited to comment on the SABC's compliance with its licence conditions and Charter more generally.

2.4. Appointing Executive Management

Recent litigation involving the SABC highlighted the alarming lack of legal clarity on who appoints the executive management. The Late Minister swore under oath that she played no role. However, this has been repeatedly contradicted, including by Cabinet.

As the Board is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the SABC meets its public interest mandate – it must have responsibility for appointing the executive management tasked with the day to day running of the organisation.

Consequently, the SOS submits that it is for the Board alone, without for example, Ministerial involvement, to appoint Group executive management, that is, the CEO, CFO and COO which should not form part of the Board.

Further, the CEO ought to be responsible for appointing other senior management personnel (that is other than the CFO and COO) but must do so in consultation with the Board.

2.5. Improving the Process of Appointing the SABC Board

The appointments process in respect of the SABC Board has insufficiently protected the public broadcaster from political interference. To strengthen this process SOS submits that Parliament needs to embrace the principles of maximum public participation and maximum transparency. As regards maximum public participation Parliament needs to:

- Publish prominent advertisements in a number of high circulation national and regional newspapers and run a series of public service announcements across all SABC channels calling for nominations for potential board members.
- Give sufficient time for the nomination process

Further in terms of maximum transparency Parliament needs to:

- publish the names of all nominees and those nominating them; including electronically;
- publish the shortlist of candidates to be interviewed with their CVs, including electronically;
- ensure interviews of shortlisted candidates are open to the public and publicise these widely, including on SABC radio and television;
- publish written reasons as to why the final shortlist was selected, including electronically; and

- publish the list of short-listed candidates for public comment before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee makes recommendations to the National Assembly.¹

Besides improving the actual appointments process, the criteria for appointment to the Board must be strengthened. In our view the criteria ought to be the following, namely that the Public Interest Representatives on the SABC Board must when viewed collectively:

- (a) enjoy the confidence and trust of the broad spectrum of South African society;
- (b) be broadly representative of South African society in terms of: race, gender, regional, economic and social interests;
- (c) act as trustees of the public interest in that they are committed to fairness, freedom of expression, the right of the public to be informed, and openness and accountability;
- (d) have qualifications and/or experience in at least the following areas: corporate governance, finance, broadcasting policy and regulation, journalism, the business of production and the application of new technologies; and
- (e) Broadly represent the following key constituencies in society including, but not limited to, business, labour, and NGO's active in the human rights field.

We further think it is important to protect institutional memory and to ensure the well functioning of the Board by ensuring that Board appointments are staggered to ensure an overlap of terms of office.

Another important issue regarding appointments is the issue of disqualification criteria. We think that the currently provisions in the Broadcast Act do not sufficiently protect the public from conflicts of interest which have arisen in relation to the previous two boards. Consequently we think that these should be bolstered to protect against political and/or commercial conflicts of interest too.

Disqualification criteria

A person may not be appointed as a Board member if he or she-

- (a) is not a citizen of the Republic;
- (b) is not permanently resident in the Republic;
- (c) is a senior public servant above the level of director

¹ This is a recommendation made in – Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2007) *Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions*

- (d) is a member of Parliament, any provincial legislature or any municipal council;
- (e) is an office-bearer or employee of any party, movement or organisation of a party-political nature;
- (f) has a direct or indirect financial interest in the broadcasting industry, other than a passive investment stake;
 - (g) is an un-rehabilitated insolvent;
 - (h) has been declared by a court to be mentally ill or disordered;
 - (i) has at any time been convicted, whether in the Republic or elsewhere, of-
 - (i) theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document, perjury, an offence in terms of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1958 (Act 6 of 1958), the Corruption Act, 1992 (Act 94 of 1992), Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, or any other offence involving dishonesty; or
 - (ii) an offence under this Act;
 - (j) has been sentenced, after the commencement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993), to a period of imprisonment of not less than one year without the option of a fine; or
 - (k) has at any time been removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct.

A person who is subject to a disqualification contemplated in subsection 3.5.1 (a) to (g) may be nominated for appointment as a Board member, but may only be appointed if at the time of such appointment he or she is no longer subject to that disqualification.

If at any stage during the course of any proceedings before the Board it appears that any Board member has or may have an interest which may cause such conflict of interest to arise on his or her part-

- such Board member must forthwith fully disclose the nature of his or her interest and leave the meeting so as to enable the remaining Board members to discuss the matter and determine whether such Board member is precluded from participating in such meeting by reason of a conflict of interest; and
- such disclosure and the decision taken by the remaining Board members regarding such determination, must be recorded in the minutes of the meeting in question.

If any Board member fails to disclose any interest as required by subsection (2) or, subject to the provisions of that subsection, if he or she is present at the venue where a meeting of the Board is held or in any manner whatsoever participates in the proceedings of the Board, the relevant proceedings of the Board will be null and void.

2.6. Removal of Members of the Board

This is a vexed issue within the Coalition. Certain members do not support the principle of the removal of the entire Board at once and its replacement with an Interim Board. They claim that this was an anomaly that became necessary only due to political interference in the appointment of the 2007 Board, which meant that the latter lacked public legitimacy. The argument is that this situation should not be allowed to be repeated. Consequently only the normal provisions of the Broadcasting Act (as amended) dealing with removal of individual members of the Board should be included. However other members of the Coalition have stated that an emergency situation may arise again and that clauses should be included that allow for the removal of the Board as a whole in exceptional circumstances. They argue that the present criteria (including the Board not fulfilling its fiduciary duties, adhering to its Charter and controlling the affairs of the Corporation) should be grounds for the removal of the Board as a whole. These members thus argue that the removal clauses included in the Broadcasting Act as amended should remain. This needs to be debated further.

In line with good corporate governance principles internationally we think the Broadcasting Act must make it clear that the Board alone is responsible for the removal of the Group executive management, without any outside involvement.

2.7. The Role of Oversight Structures – the Minister, Parliament, the Regulator, the General Public and the Proposed Public Service Broadcasting Fund

The institutional and governance framework for the SABC includes a number of institutions. Firstly, there are a set of oversight structures including ICASA, Parliament and the Ministry and Department of Communications. The general public, although ill-defined has also been seen as a player as regards oversight functions. It is important to define these various roles since there has often been confusion as to what these are and following from this there has generally been a total lack of oversight. Further, it is important to define the roles of the SABC Board and management. These governance structures need to interact with these various oversight structures. Also, there has been

confusion about the roles of the Board versus management and there have been accusations of the Board being too interventionist.

The Department and Ministry of Communications

SOS has stated on numerous occasions that it believes that the Ministry and Department's chief role is to ensure the overall viability of sustainability of the communications sector through the drafting of clear and comprehensive policy and legislation and ensuring adequate resources are available.

SOS has stated that beyond the policy, legislative and sustainability issues mentioned above the Department's role should include quarterly monitoring of financials. Management accounts however should never come directly from management but should first be approved by the Board and then the Board should liaise with the Department.

All human resource policies should be left to the Board and the monitoring of all content issues should be left up to ICASA.

ICASA

The role of the independent regulator is central to a functional public broadcasting system. ICASA is a Chapter Nine institution, the independence of which is enshrined in the Constitution. ICASA has four major obligations under the Electronic Communications Act that are relevant:

- Regulating all broadcasting and ensuring the SABC (along with other broadcasters) adheres to all relevant broadcasting regulations
- ensuring the SABC adheres to its Charter
- licencing all broadcasters and ensuring the SABC adheres to its license conditions including local content and language requirements
- and protecting "the integrity and viability of public broadcasting services"

As stated above, to date ICASA has played a very hands-off role. It has argued that the SABC crises are internal matters and that it can not intervene. In this regard however it has defined its mandate very narrowly. In SOS's view, ICASA could intervene on three grounds – breach of SABC licence (especially local content), breach of SABC Charter and the SABC's admitted lack of (financial) viability.

Further, ICASA has admitted to the rather startling fact that it has not been monitoring the SABC's compliance with its license conditions. (However, it has now promised to put monitoring systems in place.)

SOS has noted the following critical questions:

- Is ICASA interpreting its current role too narrowly, and if so, how can it be pressured to change its view?
- Does ICASA's remit need to be changed in law? And if so how?

ICASA, like the IBA before it, has complained that it is underfunded and that this affects its capacity to monitor and regulate effectively. It has also complained about its funding mechanism. Currently ICASA's budget is a line item in the DOC's budget and is negotiated with the DOC. Media Monitoring Africa, the Freedom of Expression Institute and others have argued that this arrangement compromises ICASA's independence and that ICASA should be able to get its budget directly from Parliament or the Treasury.

Parliament

Parliament has a number of powers and oversight roles. These include:

- The passing of legislation
- Selecting and recommending new members of the SABC Board (who are then appointed by the President)
- Removing members of the SABC Board
- Ensuring adherence to the Charter
- Oversight of corporate plans and finances

SOS has made a number of statements arguing that Parliament has not adequately played these roles. Firstly, in terms of the passing of legislation amending the broadcasting act last year, it has consistently ignored important submissions made by SOS and others that could have solved some of the ongoing, urgent crises unfolding at the SABC. Secondly, in terms of the appointment of the 2007 SABC Board it did not stand up to political intervention ultimately causing a governance crisis at the SABC. Thirdly, in terms of finances and Charter compliance it has not played a consistent or vigorous oversight role. Indeed it failed to consider the SABC's current budget.

What has also become clear is that, regarding oversight of the SABC, there is some confusion and possible conflict over what role Parliament should play distinct from the DOC, the Minister and ICASA.

This background raises questions:

- Should parliament's role be extended, focused or reduced?
- How can Parliamentary oversight be made more effective?

The General Public

The 'public' at large is represented by various institutions. Although the term Public Broadcasting is defined in the ECA as being only that the broadcaster is a 'public state-owned entity'. Parliament, the Minister and ICASA all have an accountability to the public for their actions in relation to broadcasting. As in other areas of government, there has in general been public consultation concerning new policies, legislation and regulation (although ICASA is not bound to always conduct such processes prior to prescribing regulations).

In terms of the legislation the general public is particularly involved in the appointment of the SABC Board. SOS has waged a fairly successful campaign in terms of ensuring maximum public participation in the nomination phase and maximum transparency in the public interview stage. Further, SOS has put forward proposals to include a public editor and provincial stakeholder committees as a way of ensuring greater public participation in the SABC. (See above.) Further debate however is needed as regards these issues.

In other countries there has been successful pressure to involve the public in creating policy and regulation. Ofcomm, the UK regulator has been conducting large scale public consultation exercises to find out what audiences want from their public broadcasters.

Public Service Broadcasting Fund

A further issue to consider is the mission, vision and roles and functions of the proposed Public Service Broadcasting Fund. This will be a very powerful institution if established. All the questions of independence, accountability and governance that have been raised in relation to SABC and ICASA would also need to be answered in relation to this new institution.

Some of the issues to consider here would include:

- Where it is located?
- The composition of its Board
- The appointment of its Board
- Criteria and methodology for its approval of funding

2.8. The Nature of Public Broadcasting Services to be Provided by the SABC

The SOS proposes that the SABC continues to provide its existing radio and television services and also the new television channels proposed in the Digital Television Regulations. However, before the launch of these new stations ICASA must conduct a public value test to ensure that the SABC's proposed offerings add public value and are cost-effective. Further, the SOS proposes that all of these services are provided on a public basis such that the public vs public commercial services and organisational divisions within the SABC are done away with.

2.9. Proposed New Hybrid Funding Model for the SABC

We believe that moving forward the Department needs to develop a funding model which is based on detailed market research, including economic modelling. We believe this policy development process needs to be thorough, substantive and comprehensive.

SOS believes that the current funding model in which advertising revenue is dominant is problematic. Amongst a number of issues it has subjected the SABC to undue editorial commercial influences and the vagaries of market fluctuations. Further, the splitting of the SABC into public and public commercial sections has not worked:

- The public channels actually make more money than the public commercial channels;
- No cross-subsidisation appears to have taken place;
- It is difficult managerially to keep these two divisions separate; and
- Advertising is in fact not restricted any more strictly on the public channels than on the public commercial channels. Yet the whole purpose of the division was to ensure that the public channels were editorially less influenced by advertisers.

Although we believe significantly more debate is required, SOS members have called for the following:

- A model where all the SABC's existing services - both public and public/commercial - together with the proposed new services become public services with a mixed funding model.
- All these services would be entitled to carry advertising but only during certain programming slots.

The major significant differences we propose from the SABC's current model is:

- all channels would be public;
- there would be a significant increase in public funding; and
- advertising would be excluded during particular public programming slots.

Public funding would be used to fund:

- Public interest programming including but not limited to news and current affairs, drama in all languages, documentaries, children's programming, educational programming;
- Transmission costs, particularly digital migration costs; and
- The preservation, digitizing, cataloguing and management of the archives – as a public asset.

Public funding for this model would be made up of a combination of licence fee income as well as a much larger annual direct appropriation of funds to the SABC by Parliament than is currently the case.